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CIVIL PROCEDURE. By Fleming James, Jr.* Boston and Toronto:
Little, Brown & Co., 1965. 672 pp. $12.
Professor James remarks in his preface' that he has many times been
asked by his students in civil procedure to recommend a textbook that
covers the subject of the course. This is an experience doubtless shared
by every teacher in the field. Hitherto the answer has had to be that
there was no such book. Professor James has now provided a ringing
affirmative answer to the old question; there definitely is such a book.
Moreover, it is a very good book indeed.
Professor James has undertaken the prodigious task of writing a one-
volume text for students which spans the coverage of procedure in the
usual law school curriculum. He keeps in steady focus the fact that it
is the law student for whom he is writing, and his long years of teaching
the subject have given him an unusual sensitivity to the problems that
beset beginning students. Praise of the book as a student text carries
with it no implication of disparagement. The law teacher tackling a
procedure course for the first time should consider Professor James
required reading, and the experienced teacher will gain fresh insights
into old problems. I confess that the preparation of this review was
inordinately prolonged by the frequency with which the text pushed
me into the searching re-examination of matters which I had for years
been taking for granted in my teaching.
Professor James has not hesitated to interrupt his exegesis and analy-
sis to present his own views of what the law ought to be. One would
scarcely expect otherwise from a co-author of Harper & James, The Law
of Torts. As in the earlier work, however, opinion is clearly identified
as opinion. Indeed, the author's convictions are frequently introduced
by the advocate's phrase, "It is submitted that. . . ." Furthermore, there
is no distortion of the holdings of cases to conform them to the author's
thesis. This practice adds to the interest and usefulness of the book.
Endorsement of this technique does not, of course, imply agreement
with all of the views espoused by Professor James. I do not, for instance,
wholeheartedly join in his love affair with the civil jury, although I
think it is in general a satisfactory, albeit expensive, mechanism for
resolving issues of fact. I am troubled by the favor with which he looks
upon the compromise verdict as a reflection of "the community sense of
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over-all fairness' '2 and his belief that a trial judge should be free to let
a patent compromise verdict stand as against either party's motion for
a new trial. If I correctly understand Professor James, he would give the
trial court discretion to leave undisturbed a verdict for $500 where
liability was closely contested and the only rational possibilities were a
$1000 verdict for the plaintiff or a verdict for the defendant.3 I would
not. I do not, however, propose to belabor these points of difference,
which are far fewer than those of agreement.
Decisions as to order and arrangement of a text on procedure are
similar to those which have to be made in planning to teach the course,
and one is forced to the conclusion that there is no perfect solution for
either the writer or the teacher. The writer has the advantage, fully
utilized by Professor James, of being able to make footnote cross-refer-
ences to relevant discussions elsewhere in the text. Although Professor
Gilmore has in these pages spoken disparagingly of the reader's "shut-
tling back and forth as he runs down the elusive supras and the enigmatic
infras,"4 these cross-references add measurably to the utility of the work.
Professor James appropriately leads off his introductory chapter with
a discussion of the distinction between substance and procedure.9 He
follows with a useful section on the adversary system., Assuming a cover-
to-cover reader starting with no legal background, this early exposure to
the relative roles of the parties and the court is an excellent idea. On the
same assumption, the first part of the next section, dealing with the rise
of the king's courts and the growth of the formulary system 7 is, I fear,
so condensed that it will leave the beginner confused. The same
criticism is applicable to a lesser degree to the treatment of the rise of
equity,8 and the struggle for supremacy between the law and equity
courts.9 An exposition of the procedural reform in this country and
England, culminating in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, ° is




3. There is authority for both positions. Compare, e.g., Martin Realty Co. v. Garver,
116 Kan. 689, 229 P. 70 (1924) (verdict vacated on appeal) with Johns v. League, Duvall &
Powell, 202 Ga. 868, 45 S.E.2d 211 (1947) (affirmed on appeal).
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Professor James next turns to a description of the American dual sys-
tem of courts and the allocation of business between them. 12 -He then
plunges into the murky waters of Erie3 and gives ten pages to a pene-
trating and closely written analysis of the problem of the law to be
applied in diversity cases. 14 He shares with many scholars disapproval of
the Klaxon' 5 doctrine, binding federal courts to follow the choice-of-
law rules of the state in which the court sits. Perhaps it is the fact that I
disagree with him on the merits that makes me a bit aggrieved by a foot-
note16 which, while disclosing that the matter is controversial, seems to
stack the deck of citations on the contra-Klaxon side. The impact of the
Byrd17 case on the outcome-determinative test of Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York' 8 is well handled. It is a pity that Hanna v. Plumer'9 was decided
after the book went to press, thus depriving the student of Professor
James' analysis of what is likely to be the most significant discussion in
the field since Erie itself.
Following a thumb-nail sketch of the life history of a lawsuit from its
inception through appeal,20 Professor James devotes several chapters to
taking up in chronological order the plaintiff's pleadings, the defen-
dant's responses and later pleadings, the relation of pleadings to proof
(variance and amendment), discovery and other pre-trial devices, and
trial itself. As he explains in his preface,2 1 in dealing with each of these
subjects he uses the historical approach of taking up the pre-merger
development in law and equity, the early codes and later code develop-
ments, and finally the modern solutions to the problems, of course in-
cluding the federal rules. In general, I think it fair to say that the
sections devoted to the common law suffer by compression and over-
simplification. But the objective is simply to sketch in the background
from which the codes sprang, and it is hard to quarrel with a decision
that a one-volume treatise of such broad scope should not give more
space to this background material. Furthermore, as is the case through-
12. Pp. 31-36.
13. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
14. Pp. 36-45.
15. Klaxon v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
16. P. 42, n.16. A better balance would have been achieved by citing, e.g., Cavers,
The Changing Choice-of-Law Process and the Federal Courts, 28 LAw & CONTEMI. PRO.
732 (1963).
17. Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc., 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
18. 326 U.S. 99 (1945).
19. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).
20. Pp. 46-53.
21. P. vi.
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out the book, Professor James gives copious citations to the leading
secondary sources so as to light the pathway for the student who wants
to delve more deeply into a problem.
The chapters on the plaintiff's and defendant's initial pleadings,2
covering what in my opinion is the most difficult part of the first-year
procedure course to teach effectively, are a laudable effort at exposition
and clarification. Perhaps it is my own peculiar difficulties in teaching in
this area that make me believe that this portion of the book does not
quite measure up to its general high standard. On the other hand, the
chapter on amendment 4 is superb, and the discovery chapter23 com-
bines effective exposition and incisive commentary. At the risk of ap-
pearing captious about small points, I take issue with Professor James
in his discussion of the necessity of the defendant in a diversity case
pleading contributory negligence where the state court makes the plain-
tiff's due care an essential element of his case, to be alleged and proved
by him.26 He not only, in my judgment, comes out with the wrong con-
clusion, but in disagreeing with his colleague, Professor Moore, he states
the latter's views in a way that does less than justice to them.27 In taking
the position that a party should not be compelled on discovery to state
his claims or contentions of fact,28 he again differs from Professor
Moore,'2 9 and again, as I have stated elsewhere, 0 I disagree with his
conclusion.
The chapter on trialP1 is excellent throughout. Of especial merit is
Professor James' treatment of the sufficiency of the evidence to establish
a proposition, a problem of perennial difficulty for students. He wisely
points outm2 that most of the seeming contradictions among the courts
equating the standards for a directed verdict with those for setting aside
a verdict and granting a new trial occur because of variations in the
new-trial test rather than in the directed-verdict test. His discussion of
the merits and demerits of the special verdict and the general verdict






27. See 2 Moone, F:DEmALPRAcrncE, 8.27[2] (2d ed. 1964).
28. P. 215.
29. 4 MooRE, FEDEAL PRACTCE, 33.17 (2d ed. 1963).
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accompanied by answers to interrogatories83 is full and fair. Predictably,
Professor James makes clear his own preference for the general verdict,
at least in personal injury accident litigation, 84 but he gives the reader a
solid basis for coming to a judgment of his own.
In writing this review I have attempted to husband my superlatives
so as to make it clear that the chapter of the right to jury trial", rates the
highest accolade. In organization, in case analysis, and especially in the
criticism of the Supreme Court opinions in Beacon Theatres v. West-
over36 and Dairy Queen, Inc. v. Wood,37 it is Professor James at his very
best. His predilection for jury trial, it should be noted, does not obtrude
upon his analysis and criticism of these decisions which, he concludes,
represent an extension of the historical right to a jury.88 When the
article on which the chapter is based appeared in this Journal, 0 I
recommended it to my students as the most useful writing on the subject
that I had seen. I remain of the same opinion.
The chapter on parties40 includes much that is not, and probably
cannot be, given adequate time and attention in the usual introductory
course in procedure. The student to whom the problems of the real
party in interest are an unexplored mystery will find enlightenment
here,4' and the same may be said of the intricacies of necessary and
indispensable parties, 42 where Professor James has borrowed heavily, as
he scrupulously acknowledges, 43 from the article by Professor Reed44
which has speedily established itself as a classic and has become every-
one's starting point for study in this field.
In dealing with permissive joinder of claims and parties, 43 Professor
James is back in more familiar territory for the beginning student. Here




36. 359 U.s. 500 (1959).
37. 369 U.S. 469 (1962).
38. Pp. 372-77.




43. P. 414, n.1.
44. Reed, Compulsory Joinder of Parties in Civil Actions (Pts. 1 and 2), 55 Micd. L.
REv. 327, 483 (1957). Professor James also acknowledges his debt to the outstanding histori-
cal study by Professor Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural




Counterclaims are covered in considerable depth,40 but the treatment
of class actions,47 intervention,48 and interpleader 9 is rather cursory.
The chapter on judgments ° is devoted primarily to res judicata and
collateral estoppel, but there is at the outset a lucid exposition of
appellate review and the limitations thereon and a discussion of col-
lateral attack.51 The treatment largely follows conventional lines. In
discussing the applicability of res judicata in situations where there are
alternative grounds of recovery for a single injury, Professor James
argues, with logic on his side, that a plaintiff should be compelled to
combine all possible theories of recovery in a single action, with the
consequence of barring a second action on a different theory when the
first fails. 52 He is critical of The New York Court of Appeals in Smith
v. Kirkpatrick53 for adopting "an excessively narrow view" of the limits
of a cause of action. 4 I have always used that case to illustrate how a
court may come to the sticking point and scrap logic to avoid patent
injustice in the case before it. It is, in the words of Judge Clark's often
quoted aphorism, a prime example of the proposition that "the defense
of res judicata is universally respected but actually not very well
liked." 55 Professor James fails to give recognition to the practical reali-
ties which put a court under pressure to reach a "just result" at the
expense of doctrinal firmness. To me the case is akin to decisions cited
by Professor James in the section entitled "Rules ameliorating the
rigors of res judicata"5 6 such as White v. Adler,67 Spilker v. Hankin,58
and Adams v. Pearson.59 In Smith the technique is to stretch the prin-
ciples to fit the facts; in the other cases the court avowedly departs from
the principle. But both devices carry the warning to the student and the
lawyer that they cannot invariably count upon the rule against splitting








53. 305 N.Y. 66, 111 N.E.2d 209 (1953).
54. P. 566.
55. Riordan v. Ferguson, 147 F.2d 983, 988 (2d Cir. 1945) (dissenting opinion).
56. § 11.35.
57. 289 N.Y. 34, 43 N.E.2d 798 (1942).
58. 188 F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1951).
59. 411 II. 431, 104 N.E.2d 267 (1952).
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The material on persons affected by res judicata" reflects modern
developments and is critical of the Restatement of Judgments in its
adherence, with but limited exceptions, to the requirement of mutuality
of estoppel. 61 In dealing with "the retreat of mutuality,"0' 2 Professor
James considers at length the landmark opinion of Judge Traynor in
Bernhard v. Bank of America 3 and the late Professor Currie's influ-
ential article on the subject. 4 He might well have included a discussion
of Zdanok v. Glidden Co.,65 a decision destined to be a leading case in
the field, in which Judge Friendly builds upon both Bernhard and the
Currie article and allows, under the peculiar circumstances involved,
the affirmative use of collateral estoppel against a prior defendant by
one not a party to the earlier action.
Professor James reserves for his final chapter, entitled "Place of Trial
of Civil Actions," 66 his treatment of jurisdiction and venue. Although it
is more elliptical than one might wish on some points, 7 it nevertheless
crowds into sixty-two pages a vast amount of useful learning. My criti-
cisms here are minor. He makes it appear, for instance, 8 that the
$10,000 amount-in-controversy requirement is an important limitation
on federal question jurisdiction. The fact is that its impact is very slight,
since almost all of the cases under this head come within specific grants
of jurisdiction which require no particular amount and need not be
based on the general grant in 28 U.S.C. § 1331, with its $10,000 require-
ment. 69 He also failed to pick up Van Dusen v. Barrack,70 which settles
the question he refers to as "not yet finally resolved" concerning the
law which should be applied by the transferee court after a transfer
under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a).




63. 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942).
64. Currie, Mutuality of Collateral Estoppel: Limits on the Bernhard Doctrine, 9 STAN.
L. RE v. 281 (1957).
65. 327 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1964).
66. Ch. 12.
67. E.g., the single sentence on venue in local actions in the federal courts, p. 618.
See Note, 70 HARv. L. REv. 708 (1957) (cited by Professor James).
68. P. 615.
69. ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts 94-96
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1965).
70. 376 U.S. 612 (1964). This case was decided March 30, 1964, and Professor James
dates his preface January, 1965; but this is hardly to be taken as a representation that
the text is current as of that date.
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section captioned "Erie and the long arm in diversity cases." ' On the
question whether the jurisdiction of a federal court in a diversity action
is limited by the scope of process of the state in which it sits, he states
his own preference for the view that the only limit on the reach of
process is the federal constitutional test. I agree with him that federal
courts should be given diversity jurisdiction in multistate multiparty
suits in which no state court has the power to render adequate justice.7-
I believe, however, that ordinarily the federal court's reach of process
should not extend beyond that of the state, and that the exceptional
situations where the rule should be otherwise ought to be left to
specific grant by statute or rule.73 As to the state of existing authority,
Professor James seems to me rather to overstate the extent to which the
question is an open one. He cites with obvious approval "the leading
opinion favoring application of the federal test," Jaftex Corp. v. Ran-
dolph Mills, Inc.,74 and it is only in a footnote that he reveals, and even
then not too dearly, that Jaftex has been specifically overruled by Arrow-
smith v. United Press International.7 5 In fact Arrowsmith, an en banc
decision of the Second Circuit with only Judge Clark dissenting, and
cases from other circuits76 within a few days thereafter, suggest that the
tide of authority is running strongly in favor of making amenability to
process in a diversity case coextensive with amenability to state process
unless otherwise provided by law.
I have been by no means certain that I was sorry for the lack of a
student text on civil procedure, as I could readily visualize a type of
hornbook which would do the student more harm than good. Happily,
Professor James has removed all such uncertainty. This book will
deservedly be blessed by generations of law students, and its publication
is a cause for rejoicing by procedure teachers.
RicHARD H. FrEUL
71. § 12.12.
72. See ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts,
38-41, 120-31, 148-49 (Offidal Draft No. 1, 1965) for just such a proposal.
73. See ALI, Study of the Division of Jurisdiction between State and Federal Courts
77-78 (Tent. Draft No. 2, 1964).
74. 282 F.2d 508 (2d Cir. 1960).
75. 320 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1963).
76. Jennings v. McCall Corp., 320 F.2d 64 (8th Cir. 1963); Walker v. General Features
Corp., 319 F.2d 583 (10th Cir. 1963); Smartt v. Coca-Cola Bottling Corp., 318 F.2d 447
(6th Cir. 1963).
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